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Abstract
This memorandum discusses the possible impact of a monetary
union in Europe on transatlantic exchange rate stability. EMU leads to
the elimination of coordination failures within the euro area. Whether
this translates into more stable exchange rates, depends on the ori-
gin of the shock. Martin´s (1997) conclusion that EMU will lead to
more stable exchange rates is shown to hold for both symmetric and
asymmetric shocks in Europe, but not for shocks that originate out-
side Europe. The results remain valid when taking into account that
the pre-EMU era was characterised by a Bundesbank-led ERM, rather
than a free float. Finally, the results are tested for a future expansion
of the euro area.
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1 Introduction
This memorandum considers the changes in monetary policy makers’ incen-
tives as a result of economic and monetary union (EMU) and studies their
possible impact on exchange rate stability between the euro and the dollar.
Most of the existing literature predicts that the exchange rate volatility
of the euro will increase as a result of EMU. See, for instance, Alosgoufis
and Portes (1997), Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry (1999), Demertzis and Hughes
Hallet (1998), McCauley (1997).1 These papers basically make two intuitive
points that are related to the fact that the euro area is relatively closed when
compared to the individual participating countries. The first point is that
the ECB will give priority to internal price stability over the external value of
the euro. Therefore, EMU may lead to benign neglect of the exchange rate in
Europe, which could lead to higher exchange rate volatility than before. The
second point is that the external adjustment channel has become narrower
and a larger exchange rate adjustment is required to restore internal price
stability after a shock (Krugman, 1989, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, Bénassy-
Quéré, Mojon and Pisani-Ferry, 1997, Hau, 2000).
A study by Martin (1997) is interesting in that it concludes that exchange
rate volatility is likely to decline when compared to a situation of floating
rates. Martin uses a simple two-country model with random supply shocks,
which stresses that the incentive to conduct an active exchange rate policy
is related to relative country size.2 The relative size of the two countries
in the model determines to which extent output is affected by domestic
shocks and the exchange rate, respectively. The larger the country, the less
its output depends on the exchange rate. Therefore, in setting monetary
policy very small countries will give priority to fixing the exchange rate,
while very large countries will hardly care about the exchange rate. Martin
finds that medium-sized countries are most likely to use the exchange rate
as an instrument to buffer economic shocks. EMU leads to the creation of a
currency bloc comparable to the US in size. This means that the incentives
to change the exchange rate have become more similar for policy makers in
the two blocs. Thus, Martin concludes that a more symmetric system will
lead to a more stable transatlantic exchange rate.
This memorandum differs from Martin (1997) in several respects. First,
it stresses the importance of the internalisation of monetary policy spill-
overs in the euro area as a result of EMU. The intuition behind this point
will be discussed below. A second aspect not addressed by Martin is that
EMU involves monetary cooperation between only a subset of all central
banks in the world. This could be important. A classic article on the inter-
1Some other studies are inconclusive: Begg, Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1997), Cohen
(1997), Masson and Turtelboom (1997).
2Openness is not an explicit variable in the model, but country size could be interpreted
as a proxy for (the inverse of) openness.
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nalisation of externalities by Rogoff (1985) shows that cooperation between
two players in a three-player game may be counterproductive (i.e. welfare-
decreasing). Rogoff proves this by giving an example where cooperation
between central banks exacerbates the credibility problem of central banks
vis-à-vis the private sector. In his example, international monetary cooper-
ation raises the rate of wage inflation because wage setters recognise that
a non-cooperative regime contains a built-in check on each central bank´s
incentives to inflate.3 Cooperation may remove this disincentive to inflate,
so that the central bank´s credibility deteriorates.
In this memorandum, I extend Martin’s model to a three-country version
in order to address the internalisation of externalities between two coun-
tries in the presence of a third country. A three-country model also allows
me to look explicitly at the impact of asymmetric shocks in the euro area
on exchange rate stability. Following Martin (1997), I use the standard
Barro-Gordon (1983) setting, apart from that policy makers are assumed to
have an output target which does not exceed the natural rate. This means
that the time-inconsistency problem does not arise. Taking an output tar-
get above the natural rate (thus taking the time-inconsistency problem on
board) would not affect the main results of this memorandum.
I look at supply shocks only. Supply shocks pose a bigger dilemma for
central banks in terms of the trade-off between inflation and output than
demand shocks. In the case of demand shocks, a monetary policy that
aims at price stability automatically dampens output fluctuations. In the
case of supply shocks, prices and output are negatively correlated, so that
a monetary policy geared at short-run price stability could adversely affect
the output gap. The bigger monetary policy dilemma means that supply
shocks are the more interesting case. Moreover, Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993) find empirically that international spill-overs on the demand side are
unimportant when compared to spill-overs on the supply side.4
3 In Rogoff ’s model, an increase in the money supply leads to a decline in the interest
rate and to an increase in the price of the domestically produced good. Since uncovered
interest parity is assumed to hold, the decline in the interest rate leads to an increase in the
nominal exchange rate (= a depreciation of the home currency). This nominal depreciation
is assumed to be larger than the increase of the price of the home good, so that the real
exchange rate increases as well. As a result, the consumer price index, which includes
the price of the foreign good, increases more strongly than the price of the home good.
Nominal wages are indexed to the consumer price index (CPI). Therefore, they increase
more strongly than the price of the home good. As a result, the demand for labour will
decline. Thus, if the money supply is increased unilaterally, a real depreciation of the
home currency, lower employment and higher CPI inflation are the result. Therefore, a
non-cooperative regime provides for a built-in check on each central bank’s incentive to
inflate.
4Bayoumi and Eichengreen state that: ‘With respect to supply shocks, in both Europe
and the US there is a core’ region [..] where the shocks are highly correlated [..]. With
respect to demand shocks [in Europe] [..] the correlation with Germany is much lower,
even for the other countries of the European core.’
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Examples of negative supply shocks are the oil price shocks of the 1970s
and adverse weather conditions, which may negatively affect labour produc-
tivity in the agricultural and construction sectors. Another example of a
negative supply shock is a credit crunch, which may increase the cost of
capital for firms. Think of the US savings and loans crisis in the early 1990s
and the fears for a dramatic widening of credit spreads in the US in the
aftermath of the Asian crisis, the Russian default and the LTCM problem
in 1998. Examples of positive supply shocks include the ’new economy’
(the effective application of information and communication technology) in
the United States and the deregulation of product and labour markets in
Europe.
The intuition behind the model is as follows. Surprise inflation reduces
the real wage rate and attracts jobs from abroad, which gives central bankers
an incentive to inflate. They correctly anticipate that other central banks do
the same, but they cannot cooperate. Therefore, inflation is overly respon-
sive to supply shocks. EMU enables European monetary policy makers to
commit that they will not shift the burden of a shock to the other European
country. Full monetary policy coordination takes place by the Governing
Council of the ECB, where the externalities involved in unduly fierce pol-
icy responses are internalised. The ECB will keep inflation closer to zero
than the national central banks in Europe did before, not because the ECB
is more inflation averse, but because of the possibility of the participating
central banks to commit against each other.
The more moderate response of euro area inflation to supply shocks
under EMU does not necessarily lead to more transatlantic exchange rate
stability. It turns out that the consequences of EMU for exchange rate
stability depend on the origin of the shock. In response to a negative supply
shock in Europe, the more moderate inflation response of the ECB leads
to more exchange rate stability indeed.5 But the situation is different for a
supply shock in the United States. In response to a negative supply shock
in the US, the Federal Reserve will engage in monetary easing. Before the
start of EMU, the sensitivity of the national central banks in Europe to
what happened in the United States caused them to ease their policy stance
as well, which helped to dampen the resulting dollar depreciation. After the
start of EMU, European monetary policy is made by the ECB, which is less
sensitive to US developments. As a result, the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy response to US shocks will cause a larger divergence of monetary
5 In the case of a shock in Europe, national central banks in Europe respond more
strongly than the Federal Reserve does. The coordination of monetary policy in Europe
under EMU implies that the ECB will keep inflation closer to zero than the national central
banks did before. The US and European monetary policy stances diverge less than if the
shock had occurred before the start of EMU. As a result, the dollar-euro exchange rate
responds more moderately to European shocks under EMU. This result will be shown to
hold for both symmetric and asymmetric shocks in Europe.
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policy stances across the Atlantic and will generate larger dollar movements
than before the start of EMU.
In order to work out this argument more systematically, this article looks
at four different types of supply shocks: symmetric and asymmetric shocks
in Europe, shocks in the US and worldwide shocks. The analysis of world
supply shocks learns that under the assumption that the average frequency
and size of shocks in Europe and the US is similar, one may expect that the
dollar-euro exchange rate will be more stable than the dollar-mark exchange
rate.
Initially, I assume that before the start of EMU, the European currencies
floated freely against each other. This assumption is commonly made in the
literature. Next, I check whether the conclusions also hold when it is taken
into account that Europe had an exchange rate mechanism (ERM), rather
than freely floating currencies, in the pre-EMU era. The specification of the
ERM account for the asymmetric character of the arrangement, in the sense
that the Bundesbank had a leading role, whereas the other national central
banks had an exchange rate target against the German mark. I also take
into account the possibility of an ERM break-down. If ERM and EMU are
compared, instead of floating rates and EMU, the above-mentioned results
remain valid. This increases the practical relevance of the conclusions.
Finally, the model’s country size parameter is used to test what happens
if the euro area expands. This is likely to become relevant, given the foreseen
enlargement of the European Union and the expected future participation
of the new member states in the monetary union. It is shown that most
of the results do not change. However, if the euro area were to become
(significantly) larger than the US, the exchange rate may become more, not
less, responsive to a symmetric worldwide shock after EMU.
The remainder of this memorandum is organised as follows. In the next
section, I will relate this memorandum to the earlier literature on this sub-
ject. In section 3, I specify a three-country model which captures both
country size and the changes to the monetary policy game. In section 4, I
derive optimal monetary policies for the European and US monetary author-
ities under floating rates, ERM and EMU and evaluate the consequences for
exchange rate stability. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Previous research suggests several possible consequences of EMU for ex-
change rate volatility. One starting point is that EMU may change the
structure of the euro area economy. Krugman (1993) predicts that increased
specialisation will lead to more asymmetric shocks in Europe. On the other
hand, Frankel and Rose (1996) argue that increasingly synchronised busi-
ness cycles will reduce the relative importance of asymmetric shocks. The
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incidence of shocks could have an impact on exchange rate stability. How-
ever, it is too early to tell on the basis of empirical evidence which of the
two explanations is right. In any case, regional specialisation and/or further
economic integration are likely to happen gradually. Therefore, changes in
the structure of the economy as a result of EMU will have no significant
impact on dollar-euro exchange rate volatility for the time being.
Another approach shows that EMU may affect exchange rate stability,
even if the nature, size and frequency of economic shocks stay the same.
The reason is that EMU is a new institutional setting, which has changed
the rules (and possibly also the trade-offs) for monetary policy makers.
EMU has several consequences for the monetary policy game. In the
first place, as discussed in the introduction, the centralisation of monetary
policy decision-making may contribute to the elimination of coordination
failures within Europe. For instance, when a negative symmetric supply
shock occurs in a floating exchange rate regime, monetary policy makers
who care about employment have an incentive to increase the inflation rate
in order to alleviate the output consequences of the shock. The action of
each policy maker has a negative externality on the other countries, as a
more accommodative policy stance aggravates the consequences of the initial
shock in the other country. Game theory predicts that monetary policy will
overreact, leading to suboptimal outcomes in the absence of coordination
(Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991).
Secondly, EMU reduces the number of players, as central bankers from
the participating Member States now collectively determine monetary policy
for the euro area in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank
(ECB), which acts as a single entity. Some argue that the smaller number of
players will facilitate policy coordination between the ECB and other major
central banks, leading to more stable exchange rates (European Commission,
1997). Others predict a move from a unipolar dollar-oriented world towards
a bipolar system around the dollar and the euro and conclude that the
emergence of a more symmetric international monetary system will lead to
more instability (Aloskoufis and Portes, 1997, Begg, Giavazzi and Wyplosz,
1997).
A third point is that the policy domain of the ECB is the entire euro area,
whereas the German Bundesbank used to be responsible for German price
stability only. The Bundesbank was of course aware of the consequences of
its policy in other countries that participated in the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism of the European Monetary System (ERM), but it is only natural that
German national interests dominated in the end. The difference in policy
domain is most important in the case of asymmetric shocks. For symmet-
ric shocks, the appropriate central bank reaction will be approximately the
same for Germany and other ERM countries (Kenen, 1997).
I have related this memorandum to Martin (1997) in the introduction.
My memorandum differs from the rest of the literature in that it explicitly
6
accounts for the fact that countries compete for economic activity and that it
incorporates the relative size of Europe and the US into the model. Ghironi
and Giavazzi (1998) focus on country size in a similar manner, but they study
a different question than I do.6 Moreover, their model is too complex to be
solved analytically. They can only interpret their results in a meaningful
way after choosing specific parameter values.
An article that is also closely related to the current memorandum is
Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Pisani-Ferry (1997). Their three-country model
is much more richly specified than mine. They look at the consequences
of both supply and demand shocks in Europe, but they do not study the
impact of foreign (i.e. non-European) supply shocks, as I do.7 Bénassy-
Quéré et al. find that real exchange rate volatility is likely to increase as
a result of EMU, but they conclude that the impact of EMU on nominal
exchange rate volatility is ambiguous.8 Also, their results for real exchange
rate volatility become more ambiguous when comparing ERM and EMU,
rather than floating rates and EMU. In this memorandum, purchasing power
parity is assumed to hold, rendering the model unsuitable for studying the
real exchange rate, but I find unambiguous results for nominal exchange
rates, not only when comparing floating rates and EMU, but also when
comparing ERM and EMU.
3 A three-country model
For the reasons given in the introduction, I will employ a three-country
model, where strategic interaction among all central banks is explicitly mod-
eled, following the Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) approach.
I will use a static (single-period) model and explore the response of the
exchange rate to several types of shocks.
3.1 Model specification
The model is analogous to Martin (1997). The world consists of three coun-
tries. Each country produces a single good and purchasing power parity is
assumed to hold.
Monetary policy makers try to steer the economy so as to keep both
inflation and the output gap close to zero. Their loss function is given by:
6They explore the issue of the optimal size of a currency area.
7Bénassy-Quéré et al. mention US supply shocks in the text, but they do not report
an exact result, nor do they give a possible interpretation.
8Bénassy-Quéré et al. find that a lower exchange rate volatility may result when output
stabilisation is included in the loss function of the monetary authorities, but believe that
having exchange rate stabilisation in the loss function is a more appropriate description of
the behaviour of the ECB. I do not share this belief, which helps to explain the difference
between their conclusion and mine.
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Li =
1
2
[π2i + βy
2
i ], i = 1, 2, 3, (1)
where πi is the inflation rate, yi is the natural logarithm of per capita output
and i is a country index. More precisely, πi is the deviation of the increase in
the general price level from the target value, which we normalise to zero, and
yi is the deviation of per capita output from the socially optimal level, which
we normalise to zero as well.9 There is no time-inconsistency problem in this
model, because the output target of policy makers is not above its natural
rate. The parameter β (>0) represents the relative weight attached to both
goals by the policy maker. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) empirically
find that the monetary policy reaction functions for the US, Japan and the
largest European countries are quite similar. This suggests that it is not
unreasonable to assume that β is equal for all central banks in this model.
Aggregate supply is a function of the real wage levels at home and abroad.
In a world of N identical regions, which compete with each other on the basis
of real wages, the supply function in region i is as follows:
yi = −(wi − pi) + 1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
(wj − pj) + ηi.
Notice that if the nominal wage is equal to the general price level country
by country, output will be equal to potential output.
Now let us take a three-country world. The country indices will hence-
forth refer to specific countries: 1 for Germany, 2 for France and 3 for the
United States. It is no longer the case that all countries have the same size.
In fact, Germany and France are of equal size (normalised to unity) and
the United States has size α, which is larger than 1. Size refers to the pop-
ulation of a country. The United States is large when compared to either
Germany and France individually. However, the euro area (consisting of
Germany and France only) may be either larger or smaller than the United
States. As long as countries are of (population) size 1, aggregate output is
equal to output per capita. This is no longer true in the more general case
of country size α. The step from output in N identical regions of size 1 to
output per capita in three regions of different size is worked out in Appendix
A. The symmetry of the European countries in the model ensures that the
US is equally sensitive to real wage developments in Germany and France.
9The output gap can be interpreted either as a proxy for cyclical unemployment (i.e.
the part of unemployment that a central bank could, in principle, exert influence on) or
as a forward-looking indicator of inflation. We will use the former interpretation in the
remainder of this paper. In the first place, this comes close to the trade-off which the
Federal Reserve is supposed to make. Secondly, it represents the trade-off for the ECB
between sticking to the goal of price stability as defined in the EU Treaty and giving in
to more short-term oriented goals that politicians may press for.
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Applying the size argument consistently would argue for making Germany
more sensitive to US than to French real wage developments. However, the
geographical proximity of Germany and France (which is strictly speaking
not in my model) would argue for mitigating these differences, if not revers-
ing them.10 I choose equal weights for reasons of algebraic simplicity. This
amounts to assuming that each of the European countries is influenced as
much by real wage changes in the US as by real wage changes in the other
European country.11 Then output per capita in the three countries is given
by:
y1 = −α (w1 − p1) + α
2
(w2 − p2) + α
2
(w3 − p3) + ε1, (2a)
y2 =
α
2
(w1 − p1)− α (w2 − p2) + α
2
(w3 − p3) + ε2, (2b)
y3 =
1
2
(w1 − p1) + 1
2
(w2 − p2)− (w3 − p3) + ε3, (2c)
where wi is the nominal wage level, pi is the price level and εi is a country-
specific random supply shock.
Several observations can be made with respect to equations (2a)-(2c).
In the first place, the amount of production in a country depends on the
relative real wage level. Wage moderation or surprise inflation lead to more
production. Secondly, relative country size (represented by the parameter
α) turns up in the equations, since supply per capita in small countries is
more sensitive to relative real wage increases abroad than supply per capita
in large countries. If a firm decides to relocate production from a large
country to a small one, the large country loses as much supply (in absolute
terms) as the small country gains. Clearly, though, the relocation has a
relatively large impact for the small country, which is reflected in the above
equations for supply per capita.12
Workers choose the nominal wage. They do not observe either the general
price level or country-specific shocks before setting wages. Workers attempt
to minimise the expected square deviation of the real wage from the wage
target, which is equal to zero.13 The utility function of workers in country
10See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) or Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998) for an application
of the gravity model to international trade.
11Using the weights which follow from purely looking at country size, that is using the
equations derived in Appendix A, does not materially change the conclusions that I present
further on in this article. My conclusion that exchange rate volatility after a worldwide
shock under EMU is likely to be smaller than before, becomes somewhat stronger, in the
sense that it holds for all α > 1.
12One may notice that if α goes to infinity, the impact of relative wages on output in
the largest country (y3) does not go to zero. However, it becomes negligible in relative
terms ( y1
y3
→ 0), in line with what one would intuitively expect.
13A positive real wage target would force output to be lower than the level desired by
policy makers. Thus a zero real wage target is necessary for having no time-inconsistency
problem in our model (see Alesina and Tabellini, 1987).
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i is given by
Ui = −E(wi − pi)2.
It is immediately clear that it is optimal for workers to choose wi = pei ,
where xe is the expected value of a variable x, conditional on all informa-
tion available at the time of decision-making. This wage rule could also be
interpreted as follows. Workers know that if they choose too high a nominal
wage, firms will make a loss, production will move abroad and unemploy-
ment will be the result. If they pick too low a wage level, more firms will be
attracted and overemployment will occur. Workers have a strong preference
for full employment, which gives them an incentive to choose the nominal
wage equal to the expected price level.
After substituting the optimal wage rule (wi = pei ) into the supply per
capita functions, I find14
y1 = α (π1 − πe1)−
α
2
(π2 − πe2)−
α
2
(π3 − πe3) + ε1, (3a)
y2 = −α
2
(π1 − πe1) + α (π2 − πe2)−
α
2
(π3 − πe3) + ε2, (3b)
y3 = −1
2
(π1 − πe1)−
1
2
(π2 − πe2) + (π3 − πe3) + ε3. (3c)
Notice that the supply curve of an individual country has a positive
slope. However, the slope of the aggregate supply curve is steeper than at
the national level. The intuition is that, when countries compete for em-
ployment, local surprise inflation in, say, country 1 raises supply in country
1 but reduces supply in countries 2 and 3. In my model, the supply curve
for all countries as a group, given by y1 + y2 + αy3, is actually vertical. It
does not depend on the inflation rates. This allows me to focus on pure
international spill-overs of monetary policy (see Martin, 1995). The fact
that the world supply curve is vertical simplifies the algebra and does not
qualitatively affect my results.
Central banks set policy in a discretionary manner. Each central bank
chooses the price level in its own country, over which it has full control.
Central banks know the supply per capita functions and observe wages and
country-specific supply shocks before setting monetary policy. They can use
the price level as an instrument to influence the real wage level, which in turn
affects the level of output. In the absence of an exchange rate arrangement
or a monetary union, central banks decide according to the loss function in
(1), subject to the supply curves (3a)-(3c).
Let Xij denote the change in the exchange rate of country j expressed in
the currency of country i. As noted above, absolute purchasing power par-
ity is assumed to hold. This implies that the real exchange rate is constant.
14 I have used that πi − πei = [pi − (pi)−1] − [pei − (pei )−1] = pi − pei , where the final
equality follows since the expectation of a past event (a lagged variable) is equal to its
actual value.
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Therefore, nominal exchange rate changes must correspond to inflation dif-
ferentials (i.e. relative purchasing power parity also holds): Xij = πi − πj .
Then (3a)-(3c) can be rewritten as
y1 =
α
2
(X12 −Xe12) +
α
2
(X13 −Xe13) + ε1, (3d)
y2 =
α
2
(X21 −Xe21) +
α
2
(X23 −Xe23) + ε2, (3e)
y3 =
1
2
(X31 −Xe31) +
1
2
(X32 −Xe32) + ε3. (3f)
The relationships above illustrate the role of the exchange rate as a po-
tential stabiliser (and destabiliser) of output. At the level of an individual
country, exchange rate changes have an impact on output, since wages are
predetermined. At the world level, the output effects of unexpected changes
in the exchange rate are neutralised: one country´s gain is another country´s
loss. This restriction helps to simplify the algebra and is not too restrictive
for our purposes, since in this memorandum, I focus on the impact of mone-
tary policy on the choice of location of production and not on the possibility
to create surprise inflation in order to increase total world output.
4 Optimal monetary policy and implications for
the exchange rate
I will discuss the outcome of the model in three different situations. The
situations only differ in the degree of cooperation between European national
central banks. There is no monetary cooperation between Europe and the
US.15 I will look at the extreme cases of floating rates and monetary union
first and compare the outcomes in both situations. Then I will consider the
ERM and see if my conclusions with respect to the impact of the start of
EMU on exchange rate stability between Germany/Europe and the United
States can be maintained.
In all cases, the timing of events and actions is as follows. First, private
inflation expectations are formed. Secondly, wages are set by the unions,
which endeavour to stabilise expected real wages. Third, supply shocks
occur. Fourth, inflation is set by the central banks, which minimise their
expected loss. Finally, output is set by firms which choose production loca-
tions in order to maximise profits.
15Here, cooperation means that agents make clearly defined, mutual commitments to
alter their own policies, in order to pursue a common objective or help each agent to
pursue its own objectives (Kenen, 1989). This is a stronger notion than cooperation as it
is used in everyday language. The assumption of no cooperation between Europe and the
US seems fairly realistic as a first approximation, since policy makers do not like monetary
policy ’to be determined on the other side of the Atlantic’.
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Under floating rates, all central banks play Nash. Under ERM, the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve (simultaneously) move first and are
followed by the Banque de France. Both the Buba and the Fed act as
a Stackelberg leader versus the Banque de France, while they play Nash
against each other. Under EMU, both central banks in Europe act as one
decision maker (ECB), which again plays Nash against the Federal Reserve.
I will initially assume that the euro area is not larger than the United
States (α ≥ 2). Later on, in subsection 4.6, I will consider the possibility
that the euro area becomes larger than the US (α < 2). This may become
relevant when new countries join EMU after expansion of the European
Union towards the East. Throughout the memorandum I will maintain the
assumption that the US is larger than any of the two regions forming the
euro area (i.e. α > 1).
4.1 Optimal monetary policy under floating rates
Under floating exchange rates, all central banks play Nash, i.e. they optimise
policy without being able to make cooperative commitments. Minimising
the loss function (1) subject to the supply curve restrictions (3a)-(3c), taking
the monetary strategies of the other countries as given, yields the following
first-order conditions:16
π1 = −αβy1, (4a)
π2 = −αβy2, (4b)
π3 = −βy3. (4c)
These conditions give the choice made by each central bank between
inflation and output loss. In the absence of shocks, πi = yi = 0, for all i. In
the case of a negative shock (εi < 0), output will be below target (yi < 0)
and there will be inflation (πi > 0). The Bundesbank and the Banque de
France will split a negative shock over output loss and inflation in a ratio
1
αβ , which reflects both the steepness of the supply curve (proportional to
country size α) and the central banks’ preferences β. The Federal Reserve
will divide a negative shock over output loss and inflation in a ratio 1β . As
α ≥ 2, it is clear that the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the large
country in our model, will choose a higher output loss and lower inflation.
It does this not because central banks’ preferences differ (they don’t), but
because the size of the US makes the Fed less effective in shifting the burden
of adjustment to other countries.
16The bordered Hessian matrix of this constrained optimisation problem is positive
definite (its determinant is −1 − α2β, which is strictly negative). Therefore, the second-
order conditions for a minimum are satisfied as well.
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Combining the first-order conditions with the above supply curve equa-
tions yields the response functions of the central banks:17
π∗1 =
µ −2αβ
2 + 3α2β
¶
ε1 +
−α2β2
2 + 2β + α2β
·
α (2 + 3β)
2 + 3α2β
(ε1 + ε2) + ε3
¸
,(5a)
π∗2 =
µ −2αβ
2 + 3α2β
¶
ε2 +
−α2β2
2 + 2β + α2β
·
α (2 + 3β)
2 + 3α2β
(ε1 + ε2) + ε3
¸
,(5b)
π∗3 =
−β
2 + 2β + α2β
£
αβ (ε1 + ε2) +
¡
2 + α2β
¢
ε3
¤
. (5c)
Notice that in the case of symmetric shocks in Europe (ε1 = ε2), the
monetary policies of the Bundesbank and the Banque de France will be
identical. This follows from the symmetry of these countries in our model.
Also notice that in the case of perfectly asymmetric shocks in Europe (ε1 =
−ε2), the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve will solely be determined by
US shocks, as ε1+ε2 = 0. In case of negative supply shocks, the equilibrium
inflation rates will be above target. The intuition is that central banks
generate some surprise inflation in order to mitigate the output consequences
of an adverse supply shock. Put differently, they endeavour to buffer the
output consequences by depreciating their own currency. Each central bank
is aware of the fact that the other central banks will also ease their policy.
However, central banks are unable to commit to the conduct of a certain
policy in the absence of formal exchange rate agreements or monetary union.
As a result, all central banks let inflation increase too much after a negative
supply shock. This is a familiar result in the literature on policy coordination
(see Persson and Tabellini, 1995).
4.2 Optimal monetary policy in EMU
The start of EMU goes hand in hand with the establishment of the ECB,
which is assumed to look at euro area variables only. As the inflation rate is
chosen by the single monetary authority, it follows directly that πE = π1 =
π2. As Germany and France are assumed to be of equal size, the increase in
euro area output per capita is a simple average of per capita output growth
in both countries
yE =
1
2
(y1 + y2) .
17Combine the first-order conditions with the supply curve equations, in order to obtain
a system of three equations in πi, πei , εi, i = 1, 2, 3. Take expectations on both sides and
assume that expectations of wage setters are rational. This yields three non-singular
equations in πei , i = 1, 2, 3, which implies π
e
1 = π
e
2 = π
e
3 = 0. This simplifies the original
system of equations, which can be solved for inflation to obtain equations (5a)-(5c).
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Plugging in (3a) and (3b) into this equation gives the supply curve for the
euro area
yE =
α
2
(πE − πeE)−
α
2
(π3 − πe3) +
1
2
(ε1 + ε2). (3a’)
The loss function of the ECB is18
LE =
1
2
[π2E + βy
2
E].
The supply curve for the United States and the loss function of the Federal
Reserve are unchanged.
Solving the new optimisation problem yields the following first-order
conditions:
πE = −αβ
2
yE, (6a)
π3 = −βy3. (6b)
As before, these conditions give the choice between inflation and eco-
nomic growth made by each central bank. The European Central Bank will
divide a negative shock over output loss and inflation in a ratio 2αβ . Thus,
it will show a tendency to be less ‘activist’ than the Bundesbank and the
Banque de France under floating rates. The creation of EMU implies that
the central banks in Europe operate as one institution. EMU enables them
to internalise the intra-European externalities. They no longer endeavour
to shift the burden of falling employment onto another European country.
However, they still try to use the exchange rate to shift the burden on the
United States.
For α ≥ 2, the ECB is at least as ‘activist’ as the Fed. The reason is
that if the United States is larger than the euro area, the ECB is better able
than the Fed to shift the burden of unemployment abroad (’size effect’).
However, for α < 2, the reverse would be true.
Combining the conditions (6a)-(6b) with the new supply curve equa-
tions (3a’),(3c), I obtain a system of two equations which can be solved for
inflation:19
π∗E =
µ −αβ
4 + 4β + α2β
¶
[(1 + β) (ε1 + ε2) + αβε3] , (7a)
π∗3 =
µ −β
4 + 4β + α2β
¶£
αβ (ε1 + ε2) +
¡
4 + α2β
¢
ε3
¤
. (7b)
18Alternatively, one could have assumed the ECB to minimise LE = 12 (L1 + L2). This
does not affect the resulting policy rules. See Bénassy-Quéré et al. (1997, p. 164) for
proof.
19Again, taking expectations on both sides and assuming that expectations of wage
setters are rational yields three non-singular equations in πei , i = 1, 2, 3, which implies
πe1 = π
e
2 = π
e
3 = 0.
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Equations (7a)-(7b) provide several insights. First, neither the ECB’s
nor the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance is affected by asymmetric
shocks in Europe (i.e. when ε1+ε2 = 0). Second, the ECB is less responsive
to US shocks than the national central banks in Europe used to be before
the start of EMU (i.e. ∂πE/∂ε3 < ∂π1/∂ε3).20 Third, the Federal Reserve’s
response function has been affected by the changed trade-off for European
policy makers.21 Fourth, in general, policy makers will keep inflation closer
to zero under EMU than under floating rates.22
4.3 The exchange rate under floating rates and EMU
In the following, I will compare dollar-deutschmark (under floating rates
and ERM) with dollar-euro exchange rates (under EMU). More specifically,
I am interested in the impact of supply shocks on the exchange rate. Since
I have assumed purchasing power parity to hold, this impact is equal to
the difference between the impact of supply shocks on US inflation and
their impact on euro area (German) inflation, which have been derived in
subsections 4.1 and 4.2. The special cases of an asymmetric shock in Europe,
a symmetric shock in Europe, a US shock and a symmetric worldwide shock
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Exchange rate response to different types of shocks
Floating rates EMU
(dollar-mark)∗ (dollar-euro)∗
1. Asymmetric shock in EU 2αβ
2+3α2β
0
(ε1 = −1; ε2 = 1; ε3 = 0)
2. Symmetric shock in EU 2αβ
2+2β+α2β
2αβ
4+4β+α2β
(ε1 = ε2 = −1; ε3 = 0)
3. Shock in US −2β2+2β+α2β
−4β
4+4β+α2β
(ε1 = ε2 = 0; ε3 = −1)
4. Worldwide shock 2β(α−1)
2+2β+α2β
2β(α−2)
4+4β+α2β
(ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = −1)
∗A positive (negative) entry in the Table indicates an appreciation (depreciation)
of the dollar.
Consider some limiting cases first. All exchange rate response coefficients
in Table 1 become zero if the parameter α, which represents the relative size
20This can be seen by comparing equations (5a) and (7a).
21The fact that the response function (7a) is affected by the changed behaviour of
European policymakers follows from the fact that the Federal Reserve faces the same
domestic trade-off as before, as can be seen from comparing first-order conditions (4c)
and (6b).
22This can be seen from comparing equations (5a)-(5c) and (7a)-(7b).
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of the US and each of the European countries, goes to infinity. The intuition
is that if the euro area were infinitely small compared to the US, even a tiny
deviation between real wages in the US and Europe would have a larger
impact on output in Europe than a domestic supply shock.23 Therefore,
even in the case of a negative shock in Europe, the best EU central bankers
can do is to follow the Fed´s monetary policy decisions, since this ensures
that real wages in the US and Europe will be equal. The policy of copying
the Fed´s policy is equivalent to keeping the exchange rate against the dollar
fixed. Thus, when α is infinitely large, Europe behaves as a small country,
in the sense that it unilaterally pegs its currency to the dollar. As a result,
the currency impact of any shock, whether in the US or in Europe, will be
zero.
Next, notice that all exchange rate response coefficients in Table 1 be-
come zero if β goes to zero. The intuition is simple. Remember that central
banks fully control the inflation rate. Therefore, if all central banks only
care about price stability, they will set inflation equal to zero in all coun-
tries. PPP ensures exchange rate stability in this case.
EMU tends to mitigate the expansionary reaction of central banks to eco-
nomic shocks, since the externalities that cause the unduly fierce policy re-
sponses under floating rates are largely internalised under EMU. The degree
of mitigation is larger in Europe, where monetary union is formed.
The more moderate response of euro area inflation to supply shocks
does not necessarily lead to lower transatlantic exchange rate stability. The
consequences of EMU for exchange rate stability depend on the origin of the
shock. It is easy to see from Table 1 that (the absolute size of) the exchange
rate response to a shock in Europe is smaller under EMU than under floating
rates. This is true for both symmetric and asymmetric shocks. Conversely,
the exchange rate response to a US shock is larger under EMU than under
floating rates.
Intuitively, one can think of the course of events in the four special cases
mentioned in Table 1 as follows:
1. Asymmetric shock in Europe
Neither the ECB nor the Federal Reserve will allow inflation to differ
from zero in response to an asymmetric shock in Europe, implying that
the exchange rate will remain unchanged after an asymmetric shock
under EMU.24 Under floating rates, however, there will be a non-
trivial dollar-mark exchange rate response after an asymmetric shock
in Europe. The reason is that the Bundesbank’s and the Banque
23This can be seen by plugging in a very large number for α in equations (3a) and (3b).
24 It is easy to see that, in EMU, the optimal policy for both central banks depends on
ε1 + ε2 (euro area-wide shock) and ε3 (US shock) only and that both these variables are
equal to zero in the case of an asymmetric shock in Europe.
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de France’s policy domain is the national economy, rather than the
euro area. It follows directly that EMU results in smaller dollar-euro
exchange rate responses to asymmetric shocks in Europe.
2. Symmetric shock in Europe
Under floating rates, the Bundesbank and the Banque de France relax
their policy in case of a negative symmetric shock in Europe. In re-
sponse, the Fed reacts by relaxing policy as well, but to a lesser extent.
The result is dollar appreciation. Under EMU, monetary policy in Eu-
rope is coordinated. Euro area inflation will increase more moderately
after European shocks than German and French inflation did before.
The Fed realises that the ECB will accommodate less aggressively than
the Bundesbank did and reacts more moderately as well. The impact
of EMU is to mitigate all central banks’ reactions to the shock, but
more so in Europe than elsewhere. The difference between the ECB´s
policy reaction and the Fed´s policy reaction becomes smaller, which
implies a more moderate exchange rate response.
3. Shock in the US
In response to a negative economic shock in the United States, the
Federal Reserve eases its policy. The Bundesbank and the Banque
de France react by easing policy as well, but to a lesser extent, which
results in a dollar depreciation. German and French inflation are overly
responsive under floating rates, but this has a mitigating impact on
the dollar-euro exchange rate response to US shocks. Under EMU, the
ECB will be less responsive to US shocks than the individual national
central banks in Europe used to be before EMU. The Federal Reserve’s
response will be mitigated as well, but to a smaller extent. Therefore,
the policy stance of the ECB and the Fed will diverge more strongly
than before, with adverse implications for exchange rate stability: the
exchange rate response to economic shocks in the US increases.
4. World supply shock
A worldwide shock is defined as simultaneous symmetric shocks of
equal size in Europe and in the US. In this case, relative country size
plays a role. Under floating rates, the dollar-mark exchange rate will
remain stable when α = 1, that is when the three countries are of
equal size. Under EMU, the dollar-euro exchange rate will remain
stable when α = 2, that is when the US and the euro area are of the
same size. If there is no symmetry in size, then the central bank of the
smallest country will have a larger incentive than the other to generate
a depreciation of its own currency and will succeed in doing so. In
reality, the euro area has roughly the same size as the US (i.e. α ≈ 2),
which implies that the exchange rate response to a world supply shock
will be smaller under EMU than under floating rates. Thus, under the
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assumption that the average frequency and size of shocks in Europe
and the US is similar, one may expect that the dollar-euro exchange
rate will be more stable than the dollar-mark exchange rate.
4.4 Optimal monetary policy under ERM
When studying the impact of the start of monetary union in Europe, it is
common to compare floating rates and EMU. This approach can be defended
on the grounds that, in the long run, the relevant choice is between floating
rates versus full monetary union (Persson and Tabellini, 1995). However,
it seems more appropriate to compare ERM and EMU. Not only were the
EMU countries required to participate in the exchange rate mechanism of
the European Monetary System in the two years before the start of EMU,
the so-called ’core countries’ had been participating in the ERM (and its
predecessor, the ’snake arrangement) for over twenty years.
The ERM had two essential characteristics. The first is that the system
was asymmetric. The Bundesbank set its policy, after which the central
banks of the other countries that participate in the ERM set their policy so
as to stabilise the exchange rate against Germany. This element is captured
by having the Bundesbank act as a Stackelberg leader against the Banque
de France. The second characteristic is the possibility of an ERM break-up.
I will assume that France was expected to stay in the ERM with probability
p and to leave the ERM with probability 1− p. Intuitively, p can be seen as
the credibility of the ERM. In this counterfactual experiment, probability
p is determined by factors beyond the scope of the model. Such factors
could be political pressure inside France to abrogate the ERM agreement
or market speculation which forces the central bank to give up its exchange
rate commitment. The probability p is known by all players in the model.
The timing of this game is as follows. First, private inflation expecta-
tions are formed. Second, wages are set. Third, shocks occur. Fourth, the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve set their policies. Fifth, the markets
determine whether the ERM is sustained or not. Sixth, the Banque de
France sets its policy.
The loss function of the Banque de France depends on the continuation
or break-up of the ERM. If France stays in the ERM, the exchange rate
is the overriding objective, i.e. there is no trade-off between inflation and
output. If France has left the ERM, the Banque de France’s loss function
has the same functional form as under floating rates:
L2,ERM =
1
2
(π2,ERM − π1)2, (8a)
L2,BU =
1
2
(π22,BU + βy
2
2,BU ), (8b)
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where π2,ERM stands for Banque de France policy given that France partici-
pates in ERM and π2,BU (y2,BU) stands for Banque de France policy (output
in France) given an ERM break-up. The first-order conditions are:
π2,ERM = π1, (9a)
π2,BU = −αβy2,BU . (9b)
The reaction function of the Banque de France, which is conditional on
the continuation or break-up of ERM, follows directly from combining the
first-order conditions (9a) and (9b) and the supply function for France:
πR2,ERM = π1, (10a)
πR2,BU =
α2β
2(1 + α2β)
(π1 + π3)− αβ
2(1 + α2β)
ε2, (10b)
where πR2,ERM = π
R
2,ERM(π1) is the reaction function of the Banque de
France if ERM is succesfully maintained and πR2,BU = π
R
2,BU (π1,π3) is its
reaction function in the case of an ERM break-up. Note that the Fed´s
policy choice does not feature in the Banque de France´s inflation choice if
France continues to participate in the ERM (i.e. ∂πR2,ERM/∂π3 = 0).
The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve play Nash against each other.
They both act as Stackelberg leaders against the Banque de France. By
moving first, the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve commit themselves to
a certain monetary policy. They will take into account the reaction function
of the Banque de France when setting their policy. However, they do not
know yet whether France will stay in the ERM. They expect the Banque
de France to play the strategy defined by equation (10a) with probability p
and to play the strategy defined by equation (10b) with probability 1 − p.
The Bundesbank sets π1 so as to minimise its loss:
L1 =
1
2
π21 +
1
2
βy21, (11)
s.t. y1 = α(π1 − πe1)−
α
2
[πR2 − πe2]−
α
2
(π3 − πe3) + ε1,
where πR2 = pπ
R
2,ERM + (1 − p)πR2,BU . The loss function for the Federal
Reserve is a similar expression. Because the Bundesbank anticipates the
Banque de France’s reaction to its own policy, the first-order condition for
the Bundesbank is defined by:
∂L1
∂π1
+
∂L1
∂πR2
∂πR2
∂π1
= 0. (12)
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Using the reaction functions (10a)-(10b), this can be rewritten as:25
π1 = −αβ[p1
2
y1,ERM + (1− p)Hy1,BU ], (13)
where H = 4+3α
2β
4+4α2β .
The first-order condition for the Federal Reserve becomes:
π3 = −β[py3,ERM + (1− p)Hy3,BU ]. (14)
As shown in Appendix B, the optimal responses are:
π1 = π2,ERM = p
−αβ
4 + 4β + α2β
[2(1 + β)ε1 + αβε3] +
+(1− p)−Hαβ
D
[A1ε1 +A2ε2 +A3ε3], (15a)
π2,BU = p
−αβ
1 + α2β
{ε2 + αβ
4 + 4β + α2β
[α(1 + 2β)ε1 + (2 + α
2β)ε3]}+
+(1− p)−αβ
D
[B1ε1 +B2ε2 +B3ε3], (15b)
π3 = p
−β
4 + 4β + α2β
[2αβε1 + (4 + α
2β)ε3] +
+(1− p)−Hβ
D
[C1ε1 + C2ε2 + C3ε3], (15c)
where all terms (H,D,A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3) are positive. Thus,
negative supply shocks lead to a more accommodative monetary policy
stance.
For p = 1, the Bundesbank and the Fed know that France will stay in
the ERM for sure and they fully internalise the fact that the Banque de
France will copy German monetary policy. The policies under such a stable
ERM will be almost equivalent to the optimal policies under EMU. The
difference is that under ERM, shocks to the French economy do not affect
Bundesbank policy, whereas German and French shock both matter (and
are equally important in this model) for ECB policy in EMU.26
25Since the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve move before the status of ERM is
determined and since they are assumed to have full control over the domestic inflation
rate, there will be a unique solution for inflation in Germany and the United States.
However, output in each country will be affected by the continuation or break-up of the
ERM and the consequent policy choice of the Banque de France. Thus, there are two
solutions for output in each country: yj,ERM may differ from yj,BU , j = 1, 2, 3.
26Note that the policy response of each individual central bank is exactly equivalent to
its response under EMU only after substituting 1
2
(ε1+ ε2) for ε1 in equations (15a)-(15c).
This result is in line with Benassy-Quere, Mojon and Pisani-Ferry (1997) and Canzoneri
and Henderson (1991).
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For p = 0, France will leave the ERM for sure and the Bundesbank
and the Fed know this. When determining their policies, they fully inter-
nalise the fact that the Banque de France has the ‘opportunistic’ reaction
function πR2,BU . It is straightforward to show that, under ERM, inflation
will generally be closer to zero than under floating rates, but further away
from zero than under EMU. This corresponds to the familiar result in game
theory that losses for all policy makers tend to be lower in a Stackelberg
equilibrium than in a Nash equilibrium.
For 0 < p < 1, the absolute value of the policy responses under ERM is
decreasing in p in the case of symmetric shocks.27 If p is high, the existing
externalities in monetary policy will be internalised to a larger extent. Intu-
itively, central banks on both sides of the Atlantic will keep inflation closer
to zero in case of a more credible ERM (higher value of p).
4.5 The exchange rate under ERM and EMU
Recall that purchasing power parity is assumed to hold. Therefore, the
exchange rate change is equal to the inflation differential, which in turn is
entirely determined by the policy response. The response of the exchange
rate to specific types of shocks under ERM is summarised in Table 2.
Table 2 Exchange rate response to different types of shocks
ERM EMU
(dollar-mark)∗ (dollar-
euro)∗
1. Asymmetric shock in EU p 2αβ
4+4β+α2β
+ (1− p)2HαβN1D 0
(ε1 = −1; ε2 = 1; ε3 = 0)
2. Symmetric shock in EU p 2αβ4+4β+α2β + (1− p)2HαβN2D 2αβ4+4β+α2β
(ε1 = ε2 = −1; ε3 = 0)
3. Shock in US p −4β
4+4β+α2β
+ (1− p)−2HβN3D −4β4+4β+α2β
(ε1 = ε2 = 0; ε3 = −1)
4. World wide shock p 2β(α−2)
4+4β+α2β
+ (1− p)2Hβ(α−1)N4D 2β(α−2)4+4β+α2β
(ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = −1)
A positive (negative) entry in the Table indicates an appreciation (depreciation) of
the dollar.
27 It is easy to check that πj > 0 and ddpπj < 0, if all shocks are negative. If all shocks
are positive, then πj < 0 and ddpπj > 0. Therefore, an increase in p will generally bring
the absolute value of πj closer to zero, j = 1, 2(ERM), 2(BU), 3.
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with
N1 = 2 + (1 +H)β + α
2β,
N2 = 2− (1−H)β + 3α2β,
N3 = 2 + (3 +H)α
2β,
N4 = 2 + (1−H)αβ + 3α2β,
and H as before and D as defined in Appendix B. All terms (D,N1, ..., N4)
are positive.
The results that were obtained when comparing floating rates and EMU
still hold when comparing ERM and EMU. I recall these results for easy
reference: EMU will result in smaller exchange rate reactions to both sym-
metric and asymmetric shocks in Europe, in larger exchange rate reactions
to US shocks and in smaller exchange rate reactions to worldwide shocks.
In comparing ERM and EMU, I will consider the different possibilities
case by case:
1. Asymmetric shocks in Europe
Under EMU, the exchange rate will not react to an asymmetric shock
in Europe at all, since neither the ECB nor the Fed will allow inflation
to differ from zero. However, there will be a non-trivial move in the
dollar-mark exchange rate under ERM. Therefore, the conclusion that
EMU results in a smaller exchange rate reaction to asymmetric shocks
in Europe is still valid.
2. Symmetric shock in Europe
It is straightforward to show that the exchange rate reaction to a
symmetric shock in Europe under ERM is larger than under floating
rates (for p = 0) and equal to the reaction under EMU (for p = 1)
respectively. The intuition is that if in an ERM which is likely to fail,
central banks will compete less aggressively than under floating rates,
but more aggressively than under EMU and that for a highly credible
ERM, the policy responses are the same as those under EMU.28 For
intermediate values of p (i.e. 0 < p < 1), the size of the exchange rate
reaction under the ERM scenario is a weighted average of these two
extreme cases. It follows directly that the earlier results (EMU results
in a smaller exchange rate reaction to symmetric shocks in Europe
than floating rates) still hold when comparing EMU and ERM.
3. Shocks in the US
The same reasoning as sub 2 leads to the conclusion that the earlier
result (EMU results in a larger exchange rate reaction to a US shock
28The latter is only true if 1
2
(ε1 + ε2) = ε1 (that is: if ε1 = ε2), but this condition is
satisfied for a symmetric shock in Europe.
22
than floating rates) must still be valid when comparing EMU and
ERM.29
4. Worldwide shocks
The exchange rate reaction to a worldwide shock under ERM is inter-
mediate between floating rates and EMU.30
To summarise this paragraph, all results that we established for the
comparison of floating rates and EMU are still valid.
4.6 A future expansion of the euro area
So far it has been assumed that the euro area is not larger than the United
States. However, if the current outs were to join EMU, and especially if the
candidate member states in Central and Eastern Europe were to join not
only the European Union, but also EMU, the euro area would become larger
than the US. The sensitivity of the earlier results to such a future expansion
of the euro area can easily be tested using the size parameter in the model.
This subsection discusses the previous results with respect to exchange
rate stability for the case 1 < α < 2. I will thus maintain the assumption
that, even after the expansion of the euro area, the US is larger than half of
the euro area. I will first compare floating rates and EMU and then turn to
the comparison of ERM and EMU.31
Floating rates and EMU
The results remain qualitatively the same in special cases 1-3 that I have
looked at in earlier subsections: The exchange rate will be more stable in
response to (both asymmetric and symmetric) shocks in Europe under EMU
than under floating rates; the exchange rate will be less stable in response
to US shocks under EMU than under floating rates, even if the euro area
were to become larger than the US.
However, the relative size of the euro area and the US may affect the
conclusion in special case 4: a worldwide shock. A symmetric world supply
shock will lead to smaller exchange rate volatility after the start of EMU,
unless the euro area were to become more than 50% larger than the United
29The condition ε1 = ε2 is satisfied in this case as well (as both values are zero), so
that, for an ERM with p = 1, the policy choices are equal to those under EMU.
30Again, the condition of symmetry in Europe (ε1 = ε2) is satisfied, so that for an ERM
with p = 1, the policy choices are equal to those under EMU.
31 It is not the purpose of this subsection to look at the effect of the euro area expansion
on exchange rate stability. Rather, I check whether the earlier results about the impact
of EMU on exchange rate stability would still be valid if the euro area were to expand
significantly.
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States.32 In the latter case, the US would obtain stronger incentives to
actively use the exchange rate as an instrument. This size effect could ulti-
mately dominate the mitigating impact of the internalisation of externalities
in Europe as a result of EMU.
ERM and EMU
Again, the results remain qualitatively the same in special cases 1-3 that
I have looked at in earlier subsections. The relative size of the euro area
and the US is of qualitative importance for the conclusion only in case 4: a
symmetric worldwide shock. If the euro area were to become significantly
larger than the United States, then world supply shocks would lead to larger
exchange rate reactions than before EMU. The more credible ERM was
thought to be at the outset (i.e. the higher p), the more likely our result is
to break down. This should come as no surprise, since in a highly credible
ERM intra-European externalities are internalised to a large extent, making
this situation very similar to EMU. For instance, if p = 0, the reversal takes
place only if the euro area were to become more than 50% larger than the
US. For p = 12 the reversal would take place as soon as the euro area were
more than 20% larger than the US and for p = 34 , this would occur as soon
as the euro area were more than 10% larger than the US. However, in the
extreme case of a fully credible ERM (p = 1) the exchange rate response to
a worldwide shock will be equivalent to the response under EMU. Thus, no
reversal takes place.33
To summarise this paragraph, our results for both asymmetric and sym-
metric shocks in Europe and for shocks in the US remain valid, even if the
euro area were to become much larger than the US. Only the result for
worldwide shocks (defined as a simultaneous shock of equal size in Europe
and the US) may be reversed if the euro area were to become (significantly)
larger than the United States in terms of population.
32This can be seen by comparing the absolute values of the entries in the bottom row
of Table 1. The exact condition is that the exchange rate response is smaller under EMU
than under floating rates if and only if (6α − 8)(β + 1) + (2α − 3)α2β > 0. It is easy
to see that for this inequality to hold, it is sufficient that α > 1.5. Numerical evaluation
shows that the inequality is likely to be satisfied for α > 1.34 (i.e. for 2
α
< 1.49, that is
if the euro area is less than roughly 50% larger than the United States). The inequality
is rather insensitive to β (maintaining our assumption that β > 0). Even if β → ∞, the
inequality will be satisfied for all α > 1.4.
33The exact condition for the exchange rate response to be smaller under EMU than
under ERM can be derived from comparing the absolute values of the expressions in the
bottom line of Table 2. The exact condition is a rather cumbersome expression. Numerical
evaluation gives the results in the main text. Intermediate values for p give intermediate
critical values for α.
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5 Conclusion
In this memorandum, I have looked at the possible impact of EMU on
transatlantic exchange rate stability. The very essence of EMU is that it
changes the rules of the monetary game. As a result, the start of EMU has
consequences for the behaviour of monetary policy makers, which may affect
the euro-dollar exchange rate.
The establishment of the ECB comes with full monetary policy coordi-
nation within the euro area, ensuring that all externalities within the euro
area are internalised in the decision making process in the ECB Governing
Council. As a result, the ECB will keep the economy closer to price stability
in response to economic shocks than the national central banks did before
the start of EMU. Even though the Federal Reserve faces the same tradeoff
as before, its response function will be affected by the changes in Europe:
the Fed will also tend to keep the economy closer to price stability under
EMU than under floating rates.
In the run-up to EMU, it was widely expected that exchange rate volatil-
ity would increase as a result of benign neglect of the exchange rate on both
sides of the Atlantic. However, using a simple two-country model which
focused on country size, Martin (1997) argued that exchange rates would
become more stable. I have extended his model to a three-country version.
This enables me to take into account a number of changes as a result of
EMU that a two-country model cannot address.
In contrast to Martin, I am able to distinguish between symmetric and
asymmetric shocks in Europe and between shocks in Europe and abroad.
Martin´s conclusion appears to be true for most but not all types of economic
shocks:
1. Under EMU, the exchange rate will react more moderately to (both
symmetric and asymmetric) European supply shocks than before. The more
moderate response of the ECB implies that the policy responses of the ECB
and the Fed to a euro area supply shock will be more alike than before,
which results in a more stable exchange rate.
2. The impact of US shocks on the exchange rate will become stronger
under EMU. The more moderate response of the ECB to a US shock implies
that the policy stance of the ECB and the Fed will diverge more (!) than
before. This causes the dollar to respond more strongly to a supply shock
in the US.
Thus, the impact of EMU on exchange rate stability critically depends
on the origin of shocks. The lower responsiveness of the ECB to European
shocks will translate into more exchange rate stability, whereas the lower re-
sponsiveness of the ECB to US shocks will translate into stronger exchange
rate movements. The analysis of world supply shocks suggests that on bal-
ance, a more stable euro-dollar exchange rate is likely to result, assuming
that Europe and the US are, on average, hit by shocks of similar size.
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The conclusions remain valid when taking into account that Europe had
an exchange rate mechanism (ERM), rather than freely floating currencies,
in the pre-EMU era. The specification of the ERM accounts for the fact
that the ERM was an asymmetric arrangement, in the sense that the Bun-
desbank had a leading role, whereas the other national central banks had
an exchange rate target against the German mark. It also takes into ac-
count the possibility of a break-down of the arrangement. This increases
the practical relevance of my conclusions.
Finally, the model’s country size parameter is used to test what happens
if the euro area expands. This is likely to become relevant, given the foreseen
enlargement of the European Union and the expected future participation
of the new member states in the monetary union. It is shown that most of
the results remain valid even in the case of a possible expansion of the euro
area. Only if the euro area were to become (significantly) larger than the
US, the exchange rate may become more, not less, responsive to a symmetric
worldwide shock than it used to be before EMU.
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Appendices
A Supply per capita and country size
The derivation of the size coefficients follows Martin (1997). Think of a
world of N identical regions, which compete with each other on the basis of
real wages. The supply function in region i is as follows:
yi = −(wi − pi) + 1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
(wj − pj) + ηi. (A1)
Now define a partition of the world in three super regions, comprising
n1, n2, n3 regions, respectively (n1+n2+n3 = N). Shocks ηi have expected
value zero and variance σ2, i = 1, ...,N . Assume that shocks within each su-
per region are perfectly correlated, whereas shocks in different super regions
are uncorrelated. Now define εk = 1nk
P
i∈nk ηi, k = 1, 2, 3. Then
V ar(εk) = (
1
nk
)2V ar(
X
i∈nk
ηi) = (
1
nk
)2[
X
i∈nk
[V ar(ηi) +
X
i,j∈nk
i6=j
Cov(ηi, ηj)]] =
= (
1
nk
)2[nk[σ
2 + (nk − 1)σ2]] = σ2, k = 1, 2, 3. (A2)
Then per capita supply in each super region is given by
y1 =
1
n1
X
i∈n1
−(wi − pi) + 1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
(wj − pj) + ηi

=
1
n1
X
i∈n1
−(w1 − p1) +
+
1
N − 1 [(n1 − 1)(w1 − p1) + n2(w2 − p2) + n3(w3 − p3)] + ηi]
= −(N − n1
N − 1 )(w1 − p1) +
n2
N − 1(w2 − p2) +
+
n3
N − 1(w3 − p3) + ε1. (A3)
Analogously:
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y2 =
n1
N − 1(w1 − p1)− (
N − n2
N − 1 )(w2 − p2) +
+
n3
N − 1(w3 − p3) + ε2, (A4)
y3 =
n1
N − 1(w1 − p1) +
n2
N − 1(w2 − p2) +
−(N − n3
N − 1 )(w3 − p3) + ε3. (A5)
Normalise: n1 = n2 = 11+α ;n3 =
α
1+α . This means that N − 1 =
n1 + n2 + n3 − 1 = 11+α .Then:
y1 = −(1 + α)(w1 − p1) + (w2 − p2) + α(w3 − p3) + ε1, (A6)
y2 = (w1 − p1)− (1 + α)(w2 − p2) + α(w3 − p3) + ε2, (A7)
y3 = (w1 − p1) + (w2 − p2)− 2(w3 − p3) + ε3. (A8)
I have adjusted the weights in the main text in order to capture the fact
that Germany and France are geographically closer to each other than to
the United States. This does not affect the main conclusions of this article.
B Optimal responses under ERM
After substituting the supply curves into the first-order conditions (9a),
(9b), (13) and (14), the first-order conditions can be rewritten in terms of
inflation:
π1 = −αβ{p+ 2H(1− p)}{[α(π1 − πe1)−
α
2
[
p
p+ 2H(1− p)π2,ERM +
+
2H(1− p)
p+ 2H(1− p)π2,BU − π
e
2]−
α
2
(π3 − πe3) + ε1}, (B1)
π2,ERM = π1, (B2)
π2,BU = −αβ{−α
2
(π1 − πe1) + α[π2,BU − πe2]−
α
2
(π3 − πe3) + ε2}, (B3)
π3 = −β{p+H(1− p)}{−1
2
(π1 − πe1)−
1
2
[
p
p+H(1− p)π2,ERM +
+
H(1− p)
p+H(1− p)π2,BU − π
e
2] + (π3 − πe3) + ε3}, (B4)
where H = 3+α
2β
4+α2β . Note that pπ2,ERM + (1 − p)π2,BU is the policy of the
Banque de France as expected by the other central banks, i.e. after shocks
occur, but before the markets determine whether or not France stays in the
ERM, whereas πe2 is the BdF policy as expected by wage setters, i.e. before
shocks occur.
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The assumption of rational expectations implies:
E(π1) = π
e
1, (B5)
E(π2) = pπ
e
2,ERM + (1− p)πe2,BU = πe2, (B6)
E(π3) = π
e
3. (B7)
Taking expectations on both sides of (B.1)-(B.4) and applying the as-
sumption of rational expectations results in a non-singular system of four
equations in four unknowns (πe1, π
e
2,ERM , π
e
2,BU , π
e
3). These equations need
to be satisfied for all admissable values of α, β, and p, which is only the case
for πe1 = π
e
2,ERM = π
e
2,BU = π
e
3 = 0.
This simplifies the first-order conditions, which can then be rewritten to
the following reduced-form equations:
π1 = π2,ERM = p
−αβ
4 + 4β + α2β
[2(1 + β)ε1 + αβε3] +
+(1− p)−Hαβ
D
[A1ε1 +A2ε2 +A3ε3], (B8)
π2,BU = p
−αβ
1 + α2β
{ε2 + αβ
4 + 4β + α2β
[α(1 + 2β)ε1 + (2 + α
2β)ε3]}+
+(1− p)−αβ
D
[B1ε1 +B2ε2 +B3ε3], (B9)
π3 = p
−β
4 + 4β + α2β
[2αβε1 + (4 + α
2β)ε3] +
+(1− p)−Hβ
D
[C1ε1 + C2ε2 + C3ε3], (B10)
with
H =
4 + 3α2β
4 + 4α2β
,
D = 4 + 4Hβ + 4(1 +H)α2β + 3H(1 +H)α2β2 + 3Hα4β2,
A1 = 4 + 4Hβ + 4α
2β + 3Hα2β2,
A2 = 2α
2β + 3Hα2β2,
A3 = 2Hαβ + 3Hα
3β2,
B1 = 2Hα
2β + 3H2α2β2,
B2 = 4 + 4Hβ + 4Hα
2β + 3H2α2β2,
B3 = 2Hαβ + 3H
2α3β2,
C1 = 2Hαβ + 3Hα
3β2,
C2 = 2αβ + 3Hα
3β2,
C3 = 4 + 4(1 +H)α
2β + 3Hα4β2.
All terms (H,D,A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3) are positive.
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